STATE OF WISCONSIN
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION
P O BOX 8126, MADISON, WI 53708-8126 (608/266-9850)

MARK W. JONES, Employee

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, Employer

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DECISION
Hearing No. 10401048AP


An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Division of Unemployment Insurance of the Department of Workforce Development issued a decision in this matter. A timely petition for review was filed.

The commission has considered the petition and the positions of the parties, and it has reviewed the evidence submitted to the ALJ. Based on its review, the commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue -- The employee, Mark W. Jones, worked for St. Norbert College for over 4 years, until that employment ended in February, 2008. He then worked for several months for Green Bay Botanical Garden. He then voluntarily terminated his employment with Green Bay Botanical Garden effective the end of July 2008, in order to take a job with American Cancer Society, Inc. ("ACS"). The employee's job with ACS then ended in March, 2009. The employee then started a claim for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.

The employee's benefit claim had a lengthy and complicated procedural history, including a number of initial determinations and appeal tribunal decisions, addressing a number of issues. Procedurally, what is now before the commission is a petition for review of an appeal tribunal decision issued on June 16, 2010 (Hrg. No. 10401048AP), which affirmed an initial determination issued on February 2, 2010 (ID No. 100100031). Substantively, the issue which that petition raises is whether the work the employee did for ACS was in "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government" within the meaning of that phrase as it is used in the UI Act.
That issue arose because of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(7)(a), which states:

(7) VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF WORK. (a) If an employee terminates work with an employing unit, the employee is ineligible to receive benefits until 4 weeks have elapsed since the end of the week in which the termination occurs and the employee earns wages after the week in which the termination occurs equal to at least 4 times the employee's weekly benefit rate under s. 108.05 (1) in employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government.

It is not disputed, that the employee voluntarily terminated work within the meaning of (7)(a) when he quit his job with Green Bay Botanical Garden to take a job with ACS. However, it is also not disputed that by the time the employee began his claim for UI benefits in 2009, more than 4 weeks had elapsed since the week in which he quit his job with Green Bay Botanical Garden and he had earned wages from his work for ACS equal to at least 4 times his weekly benefit rate. Thus, if the work the employee did for ACS was "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government," he satisfied the requalification requirements of (7)(a) and would be eligible for benefits on that basis. (1) 
 

Facts - American Cancer Society, Inc., is an incorporated, nonprofit organization dedicated to eliminating cancer and diminishing the suffering from cancer. It is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. At all times relevant to the issue presented in this case, there were fewer than four individuals performing service for ACS as its employees, in Wisconsin.

ACS charters 13 regional divisions that are mandated by the charter to contribute 40% of their fundraising proceeds to ACS. The American Cancer Society Midwest Division, Inc. ("ACSMD"), which is also an incorporated, nonprofit organization, is one of those chartered regional divisions dedicated to the same purpose as ACS. ACS and ACSMD each have their own governing Board of Directors, their own payroll, and their own employment rules and regulations.

At the times relevant to the issue presented in this case, ACSMD had over 100 employees performing services for it in Wisconsin.

The employee was hired by ACS on August 1, 2008, as the national director for fund raising campaign strategy. He was informed that it was his job to support the divisions in their fund raising efforts. He was also expected to provide fund raising advice to the Hope Lodge Network fundraisers, a group seeking to build lodging for those receiving cancer treatment in cities away from their residences. The Hope Lodge Council is a representative group of six division CEO's, including the CEO of ACSMD. The vice president of the Hope Lodge Network is an employee of ACS. The Hope Lodge Council directed the employee as to where he should expend his fund raising consultation efforts.

The employee was allowed to remain in Wisconsin where he used the equipment in the ACSMD office in De Pere, Wisconsin for a nominal fee paid by ACS to ACSMD. ACS informed him that another reason for his doing some of his work from a division office was to see the local services being done and "to become acculturated" to the American Cancer Society. His work did not require him to be located in Wisconsin and, in fact, he traveled to other division locations throughout the country to provide advice to the fund raisers of other chartered divisions. His supervisor was located in Arizona. 
 

Discussion - To satisfy the requalification requirement of Wis. Stat. 108.04(7)(a), an employee must work and earn a stated amount in wages in "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government." For work to be covered by an unemployment insurance law, the work must be performed for an employing unit which is subject to the provisions of that law. The controlling issue in this case is whether ACS was an employer covered by and subject to Wisconsin's UI law. (2)

Whether an employing unit is covered by the UI law is determined by whether it falls within the UI Act's definition of the term, "employer," which is found in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13). An employing unit becomes a subject employer, covered by the UI Act, if and when that employing unit falls within that definition. Specifically in the case of an entity which is a nonprofit organization, such as ACS,
it becomes an "employer" subject to the UI Act if and when it meets the standards set out in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13)(b), which provides:

(b) Any employing unit which is a nonprofit organization shall become an employer as of the beginning of any calendar year if it employed as many as 4 individuals in employment for some portion of a day on at least 20 days, each day being in a different calendar week, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, in either that year or the preceding calendar year.

ACS never employed as many as 4 individuals in Wisconsin at any one time. For this reason, it was not and is not an "employer" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13), and it was not and is not subject to or covered by the UI law of Wisconsin. Therefore, the employee's earnings from his work for ACS could not be used to satisfy the requalification requirement of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(7)(a).

The employee has raised four distinct arguments that his work for ACS should have been considered covered so that his earnings from that work could be used to requalify for benefit eligibility First, he argued that ACS and ACSMD should be considered to be a single entity such that the employees of ACSMD could be counted towards the numerical test for nonprofit organizations to be subject in Wisconsin. Second, he argued in the alternative that employees of ACS working in other states should be counted towards that test. Third, he argued that it was contrary to the public policy goals behind the Act to allow ACS to escape being a subject employer in Wisconsin. Fourth, he argued that that under § 108.02(15)(n), his work for ACS should be considered covered. For the reasons discussed below, the commission does not find these arguments persuasive.

Should ACS and ACSMD be treated as a single employing unit? -- In support of his argument that ACS and ACSMD should be seen as being a single employing unit such that all of their employees should go into the "count" for coverage purposes, the employee makes a number of assertions about the manner in which ACS and ACSMD operate and interact. These have to do with such things as the two organizations having common "mission statements," some overlap in board of directors members, a "chartering" relationship, a common, shared on-line presence, use of the same software and other administrative resources, financial links, and placement of ACS employees in ACSMD offices.

These claims are not all supported by the record. In addition, other facts are more consistent with viewing ACS and ACSMD as separate employing entities. Significant among these is the fact that they have separate tax identification numbers. Most important in the commission's view, though, is the fact that ACS and ACSMD are legally separate entities in that they are both corporations.

Corporations are legal entities distinct from the individuals involved with them, and the existence of a corporation as a distinct legal entity is not to be lightly disregarded. Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 474, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988). Courts may be justified in disregarding the corporate form when it is used to accomplish an improper or unlawful purpose, Olen v. Phelps, 200 Wis. 2d 155, 163, 546 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1996), but there is no persuasive evidence that anything like that was going on here.

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13)(a), the Act's definition of the term "employer," provides that "employer" means, in relevant part, "any person, association, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign." Because a corporation is listed as a type of entity which can be an "employer," it is not permissible to simply ignore the separate legal existence of two corporations and declare them to somehow be one single "employer."

In addition, the UI Act contains provisions that more directly preclude the possibility of treating ACS and ACSMD as being one entity. In Wis. Stat. § 108.02(21s), the Act defines the term "related corporations" for purposes of the Act, and in Wis. Stat. § 108.065(2), it specifically defines the circumstances in which an individual performing services for one of two corporations may be found to be an employee of the other. Because the Act so specifically addresses the circumstances in which this may occur, it is clear that outside of the circumstances described in these provisions, the separate existence of two corporate employers may not be disregarded.

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(21s) provides:

"Related corporations" means 2 or more corporations to which at least one of the following conditions applies:

(a) The corporations are members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in 26 USC 1563, or would be members if 26 USC 1563 (a) (4) and (b) did not apply and if the phrase "more than fifty percent" were substituted for the phrase "at least eighty percent" wherever it appears in 26 USC 1563(a).

(b) If the corporations do not issue stock, either 50% or more of the members of one corporation's governing body are members of the other corporation's governing body, or the holders of 50% or more of the voting power to select such members are concurrently the holders of more than 50% of that power in respect to the other corporation.

(c) Fifty percent or more of one corporation's officers are concurrently officers of the other corporation.

(d) Thirty percent or more of one corporation's employees are concurrently employees of the other corporation.

Subparagraph (a) does not apply. 26 U.S.C. § 1563 governs only stock corporations, and as nonprofits, ACS and ACSMD are non-stock corporations. Subparagraph (b) does not apply. The employee conceded in his testimony that the overlap in board of directors members between ACS and ACSMD did not reach 50%, and there is no evidence of a sufficient overlap in the holders of the voting power to elect such members. There is also no evidence establishing the overlap in corporate officers or corporate employees necessary for subparagraphs (c) or (d) to apply.

In any event, even if ACS and ACSMD were "related corporations" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(21s), this would not result in an outcome helpful to the employee. Wis. Stat. § 108.065, which governs determination of who the employer of an employee is, provides:

(2) A corporation which pays wages to an employee who is concurrently employed by that corporation and one or more related corporations for work performed for the corporation which pays the wages and the related corporation or corporations is the employer of that employee.

The record clearly establishes that ACS paid the employee's wages. (3) Thus, under § 108.065(2), even if ACS and ACSMD were "related corporations," ACS would still be "the employer" of the employee.

ACS and ACSMD are legally distinct entities. Although there are connections between them, those connections are not the kind of connections which the UI Act recognizes as sufficient to affect their status as being legally distinct. Whether the employee's requalifying wages were earned "in employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government" must be determined with regard to ACS, not ACSMD. Therefore the employee's argument for considering ACS and ACSMD together as one employer, must be rejected.

Should employees of ACS working in other states be included in the "count" of ACS employees under § 108.02(13)(b) ? --

The employee argues that the many employees of ACS who work in other states should be counted in determining if the "4 individuals" threshold in § 108.02(13)(b) is met, and he contends that nothing in the law requires that only employees working in Wisconsin are to be counted.

The employee is incorrect.

As noted above, the UI Act's definition of "employer," in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13), provides that a nonprofit organization is an employer if it employs as many as 4 individuals "in employment" for the requisite number of days. The word "employment" is one which is expressly defined in the Wisconsin UI Act, see, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15). Therefore, where it is used in the Act it must be given its defined meaning. Thus, for employees of a nonprofit to be counted for purposes of determining the nonprofit's status as an "employer" in Wisconsin, those employees must be providing service which falls within the UI Act's definition of "employment" in § 108.02(15) - and that definition contains express, detailed requirements having to do with where the services are performed:

(15) EMPLOYMENT. (a) "Employment", subject to the other provisions of this subsection means any service, including service in interstate commerce, performed by an individual for pay.

(b) The term "employment" shall include an individual's entire service performed within, or partly within and partly outside, Wisconsin, if such service is "localized" in Wisconsin; and shall also include such service, if it is not "localized" in any state but is performed partly within Wisconsin, and if:

1. The base of operations, or, if there is no base of operations, then the place from which such service is directed or controlled, is in Wisconsin; or

2. The base of operations or place from which such service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of such service is performed, but the individual's residence is in Wisconsin.

(c) An individual's entire service for an employer, whether performed partly within or entirely outside Wisconsin, shall be deemed "employment" subject to this chapter, provided both the following conditions exist:

1. Such service is deemed "employment" covered by this chapter pursuant to a reciprocal arrangement between the department and each agency administering the unemployment insurance law of a jurisdiction in which part of such service is performed; or no contributions are required with respect to any of such service under any other unemployment insurance law; and

2. The employer so elects with the department's approval and with written notice to the individual.

(d) An individual's entire service shall be deemed "localized" within a state, if such service is performed entirely within such state, or if such service is performed partly within and partly outside such state but the service performed outside such state is incidental to the individual's service within such state (for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions).

(dm) "Employment" includes an individual's service, wherever performed within the United States or Canada, if:

1. Such service is not covered under the unemployment insurance law of any other state or Canada; and

2. The place from which the service is directed or controlled is in Wisconsin.

Consideration of the scope of these provisions makes it clear, that employees of ACS working in other states cannot be considered to be engaged in "employment" for purposes of the Wisconsin UI Act, and they therefore cannot be counted to determine if ACS is an "employer"

Under subsection (b) of this definition, for services to be "employment" they must be performed at least partly within Wisconsin. (4)  The only circumstances in which services of an individual performed wholly outside of Wisconsin (i.e., not even partly within Wisconsin) may be considered "employment" for purposes of the Wisconsin UI Act, are described in subsections (15)(c) and (dm).

Under subsection (15)(c), an individual's service performed entirely outside Wisconsin may be considered "employment" for purposes of the Wisconsin UI Act only if certain conditions are met, one of those being that the employer has elected such coverage with the approval of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development and written notice of this has been given to the individual providing the services. There is no evidence that there was ever any such election, approval or notice with regard to any employees of ACS who provided their services entirely outside of Wisconsin. Thus, this subsection does not apply.

Under subsection (dm) of this section, an individual's service performed entirely outside Wisconsin may be considered "employment" for purposes of the Wisconsin UI Act only if certain other conditions are met, those conditions being that the services are not covered under the unemployment insurance law of any other state or Canada, and the place from which the service is directed or controlled is in Wisconsin. There is no evidence that any employees of ACS who provided their services entirely outside of Wisconsin, had their services directed or controlled from a place within Wisconsin. Thus, this subsection also does not apply.

For these reasons, the employee's argument for counting ACS employees working in other states when determining if ACS is an employer under § 108.02(13)(b), must be rejected.
 

"Public policy" argument - The employee argues that "allowing ACS to be exempt from Wisconsin's unemployment laws contradicts the public policy reasons for establishing an unemployment insurance program and particularly the reasons for maintaining the exemption for small nonprofit organizations." He argues that while there have always been some employers and employees who were not covered by applicable UI laws, the trend has been to increase coverage. He continues by arguing:

The unemployment insurance exemption for nonprofit organizations with less than four employees was created by FUTA [Federal Unemployment Tax Act] amendments of 1970, along with the corresponding state law amendments that followed. According to the explanatory comments to the draft legislation (H.R. 14705) that resulted in the 1970 amendments, this provision was an attempt to give relief to small nonprofits by exempting them from the administrative and financial burdens of the unemployment laws. Courts have subsequently acknowledged this legislative history and noted that the exemption was directed at "small nonprofits." Rojas v. Fitch, 928 F. Supp. 155, 162-67 (D.R.I. 1996). Although not stated explicitly in the historical record, the implication is that lawmakers sought to help nonprofits that have only limited staff, small budgets and modest resources.

The exemption from the unemployment laws for nonprofits under FUTA and Wis. Stats. 108 was clearly not intended to benefit large, wealthy nonprofit organizations. It was certainly not intended for a billion-dollar-per-year entity like the American Cancer Society, which boasts over two million volunteers and proudly proclaims that it is "the most well-known health organization in the United States."

However, this argument ignores the other, at least equally significant policy considerations that are reflected in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(b) through (dm). Every state which establishes a UI law, must necessarily draw lines defining the geographical reach of that law. There is necessarily a limit to the power of any state to assert the authority of its UI law over employers which are located in other states, and which employ employees who work in those other states.

The American Cancer Society is not "exempt" from the application of UI laws generally. In any state in which ACS has at least 4 employees for the requisite period of time - and this presumably includes Georgia, where ACS is headquartered - the UI law of that state will presumably apply and consider ACS a subject employer. Individuals who work for ACS in such states will be in covered employment in those states. However, the unavoidable fact in this case, is that ACS does not have a sufficient number of employees who work for it as its employees in Wisconsin, for it to be subject to Wisconsin's UI Act.
 

Does Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(n) "negate" the "exemption" for small nonprofits in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13)(b) ? - The employee asserts that "even if...[his] employment is excluded from coverage by Wisconsin unemployment laws by the exemption for small nonprofits at Wis. Stats. 108.02(13)(b), that exclusion is ultimately negated by Wis. Stats. 108.02(15)(n) and its incorporation of federal requirements spelled out in FUTA (26 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq."

The employee misunderstands the intent and effect of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(n).

That section, which is part of the definition of the term "employment", provides:

(n) If any employment for a government unit, Indian tribe, or nonprofit organization excluded under other paragraphs of this subsection is required by the federal unemployment tax act, the social security act, or any other federal law, to be employment covered by this chapter as a condition for approval of this chapter for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the federal unemployment tax act, such exclusion shall not apply under this chapter.

The employee asserts that "his employment by ACS is indeed 'employment required by the federal unemployment tax act [FUTA]" to be covered under Wis. Stats. 108."

Employee's argument misstates the reasons for the decision in this case and misapprehends the relevance of the statutory provisions that resulted in that decision. Specifically, he mischaracterizes the manner in which Wis. Stat. § § 108.02(13) and 108.02 (15) apply here, confusing the exclusion in § 108.02(15) of certain kinds of services from the definition of "employment," with the non-inclusion in § 108.02(13) of certain kinds of entities from the definition of "employer."

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13) is the definition of "employer." It begins with a subparagraph, (a), that states in broad and general terms that "employer" includes a wide set of entities, if they were either subject to the Act under the statutes of 1975 or they "become subject to this chapter under this subsection." It then continues with a series of subparagraphs that state the specific conditions on which various kinds of entities become subject to the chapter. Thus, for an entity of any kind to be an "employer" subject to the Act, it must fall within the conditions described in one of the subparagraphs of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13). One of those subparagraphs is (b), which states the specific conditions on which a nonprofit organization becomes subject to the chapter. It provides that a nonprofit organization "shall become an employer if" it employed a stated number of individuals, for a stated period of time, "in employment." This is not an "exemption" for small nonprofit organizations, as the employee characterizes it, and neither is it an "exclusion." Rather, this is a description of the only situation in which nonprofit organizations are even considered "employers" in the first place.

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15) is the definition of "employment." It begins with a subparagraph, (a), that states that "subject to the other provisions of this subsection," "employment" means any service performed by an individual for pay. It then continues with a series of subparagraphs ((b), (c), (d), (dm), (dn), (do), and (e)), which define what services are included within the term "employment" based on where those services are performed, "localized," based, directed or controlled. It then continues with a series of subparagraphs ((f), (g), (gm), (h), (i), (j), (k), (km), and (L)), that specifically exclude certain services from the meaning of the term "employment" based on the type of work and employer involved. Finally, it ends with a subparagraph, (n), which states:

If any employment for a government unit, Indian tribe, or nonprofit organization excluded under other paragraphs of this subsection is required by the federal unemployment tax act, the social security act, or any other federal law, to be employment covered by this chapter as a condition for approval of this chapter for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the federal unemployment tax act, such exclusion shall not apply under this chapter.

By its express terms, this provision is directed at specific kinds of employment which are "excluded under other paragraphs of this subsection" - in other words, at the specific exclusions in subparagraphs (f) through (L). It is in effect a "savings clause," intended to protect the Wisconsin Act from running afoul of a FUTA requirement which would thus cause the Wisconsin Act to be out of conformity with federal law. It simply provides that if any of the "exclusions" in § 108.02(15) are contrary to federal law, "such exclusion shall not apply."

Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(n) is irrelevant to the employee's situation, though, because the outcome arrived at in his case was not the result of the application of any of the exclusions from the meaning of the term "employment" which are listed in § 108.02(15) (f) through (L). Instead, it was the result of the application of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13)(b), which is the part of the definition of "employer" which concerns nonprofit organizations.

Contrary to the employee's argument, § 108.02(15)(n) can not "negate" § 108.02(13)(b); it can only "negate" the specific "exclusions" from the definition of "employment" in § 108.02(15), which as noted above are found in § 108.02(15) subparagraphs (f) through (L). Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13), which describes the circumstances under which a nonprofit organization becomes an "employer," is not an "exclusion" in § 108.02(15); indeed is not a part of § 108.02(15) at all.

Even though the interpretation and application of § 108.02(13)(b) requires applying the term "employment" (which is included as part of the definition in § 108.02(13)(b)), this still does not implicate any of the exclusions from § 108.02(15) found in subparagraphs (f) through (L) thereof. The decision that ACS was not an "employer" subject to the Act followed from the fact that it did not have a sufficient number of individuals providing services in "employment" because of the provisions in § 108.02(15)(b) through (e) regarding where services are performed in order for them to become "employment" in the first place. Those provisions of § 108.02(15) - i.e., subparagraphs (b) through (e) - are not "exclusions" reached by § 108.02(15)(n).

Conclusion -- For all the foregoing reasons, it is therefore found that at the times material herein, ACS was not covered as an "employer" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(13). It is further found that at the times material herein, the employee's work for ACS was not "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government" within the meaning of that phrase as it is used in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(7).

DECISION

The decision of the administrative law judge is modified to conform with the foregoing and, as modified, is affirmed. Accordingly, the employee's wages earned from services performed for American Cancer Society, Inc., cannot be used to requalify for unemployment benefits.

Dated and mailed October 22, 2010
jonesma . urr : 110 : BR 339 ; ET 483.10 ; ER 495

/s/ James T. Flynn, Chairperson

/s/ Robert Glaser, Commissioner

/s/ Ann L. Crump, Commissioner

 

NOTE: The commission had no disagreement with the material findings of fact made by the administrative law judge. It has issued its own decision in order to more fully set forth the reasons that it arrived at the same ultimate conclusion as the administrative law judge.

 

cc: American Cancer Society Midwest (Pewaukee, WI)


Appealed to Circuit Court.  Affirmed, June 22, 2011.  [Circuit Court decision summary]

[ Search UC Decisions ] - [ UC Digest - Main Index ] - [ UC Legal Resources ] - [ LIRC Home Page ]


Footnotes:

(1)( Back ) The "employment or other work" language is also relevant because it appears in an exception to Wis. Stat. 108.04(7)(a). Under Wis. Stat. 108.04(7)(L), the benefit ineligibility created by (7)(a) does not apply if an employee voluntarily terminated work to accept other work on terms equal to or better than the quit work, earns sufficient wages in such work, and if the work accepted is "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government." It is not disputed that the employee's work at ACS was on better terms than his work at Green Bay Botanical Society such as to meet the tests of (7)(L), and that he earned a sufficient amount of wages. Whether the (7)(L) exception was applicable thus also came down to the issue of whether the employee's work for ACS was in "employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government."

(2)( Back ) There is no contention that the employee's work for ACS was covered by the UI law of any other state. The employee acknowledged that he was told by Georgia, where ACS is headquartered, that he was not eligible there. He did not apply for benefits in any other states where affiliates of ACS were operating. The employee's sole argument touching on the question of the application of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is discussed below, infra at p. 10.

(3)( Back ) The employee testified that his paychecks came from ACS in Georgia. The employee's W-2 form came from ACS and listed it as the employer. The witness for ACSMD testified that ACSMD did not pay the employee.

(4)( Back ) It should be noted that even if an individual's services are performed "partly within and partly outside, Wisconsin," they will still not be "employment" unless certain other conditions are met, these conditions having to do with whether the services are "localized" in Wisconsin, and whether the "base of operations" or the place from which such services are "directed or controlled" is in Wisconsin.

 


uploaded 2011/01/14