STATE OF WISCONSIN
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION
P O BOX 8126, MADISON, WI 53708-8126
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/lirc/

ERIC W VAN DE LOO, Employee

BEMIS MFG CO, Employer

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DECISION
Hearing Nos. 13403969AP, 13403970AP


PROCEDURAL HISTORY

An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Division of Unemployment Insurance of the Department of Workforce Development issued two appeal tribunal decisions on December 17, 2013.

For hearing number 13403969AP, the ALJ found that the employee worked and earned wages in weeks 9 and 11 through 39 of 2013, concealed that work and wages and, thus, was ineligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in those weeks and was subject to a 15% concealment penalty for the overpaid benefits. Specifically, the decision found that the employee was required to repay the overpaid UI benefits totaling $6,079.00, and it imposed a concealment penalty of $911.85.

For hearing number 13403970AP,(1) the ALJ found that for the employee's concealment of work and wages in weeks 9 and 11 through 39 of 2013, the employee's future UI benefit eligibility would be reduced by $12,582.00 for benefits and weeks that become payable by November 9, 2019.

The employee timely petitioned for commission review.

The commission considered the petition and the positions of the parties, and it reviewed the evidence submitted to the ALJ. Based on its review, the commission issued a decision on February 28, 2014, modifying the appeal tribunal decisions, affirming them in part and reversing them in part.

On March 26, 2014, the commission received a Request for Reconsideration from the Unemployment Insurance Division, Bureau of Legal Affairs. The Request for Reconsideration presented arguments and offered additional evidence in the form of affidavits from individuals who did not appear at the original hearings before the ALJ. On March 28, 2014, pursuant to its authority under Wis. Stat. § 108.09(6)(b) and (d), the commission set aside its February 28, 2014, decisions for reconsideration.

The commission has reviewed the evidence submitted to the ALJ, and it has consulted with the ALJ regarding credibility. It has also considered the original petition, the positions of the parties and the arguments made by the department in its Request for Reconsideration. Based on its review, the commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The employee appeared at the hearing, representing himself. The employer appeared, represented by its Human Resources Manager and a potential employer witness. However, only the employee testified. The department did not appear and did not present witness testimony. The ALJ marked department records during the employee's testimony, and those records were received into evidence as Exhibits 1 through 7.

Facts Adduced at Hearing

The employee, who is 30 years old, had been discharged from his full-time employment with Quality State Oil Co., Inc., in the beginning of February 2013. His prior work experience consisted of food service work, work as a gas station attendant, and factory production work. After his discharge, he enrolled in a two-year technical college program to further his education. He also sought new employment and filed a claim for UI benefits. There is no evidence that the employee ever filed for, or received, UI benefits prior to February 28, 2013.

The employee completed his claim for UI benefits on March 1, 2013, the same day on which he attended a three-hour orientation for his new part-time employment with Bemis Manufacturing Company (Bemis), the employer. When the employee's UI claim was processed, he was informed that his school attendance was considered approved training for UI purposes.

The employee testified that, when he filed for UI benefits, he also notified the UI claims specialist of his part-time employment with Bemis.(2) He understood that, given his approved training status, he was not required to make a work search and was not required to report his part-time wages with Bemis.(3)

Exhibit 6 contains a FORMS SENT INQUIRY SCREEN, a list of unemployment documents sent to the employee at the time he filed his benefit claim. The employee was mailed a claim confirmation form, FORM TYPE 10148, on March 2, 2013. A sample FORM TYPE 10148 (UCB-10148) sent to claimants, with a revision date of March 28, 2012, is also contained within Exhibit 6. It is titled "CLAIM CONFIRMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS." The sample explains that it was sent with a packet containing the Handbook for Claimants, if the claim was based upon a new application. A copy of the Handbook for Claimants, with a revision date of October 2012, was marked as Exhibit 7.

In this case, the employee filed his claim certifications via the department's Internet claiming system. When filing his claim certifications for weeks 9 and 11 through 39 of 2013, the employee responded "No" to Question 4,

During the week, did you work or did you receive or will you receive sick pay, bonus pay, or commission?

However, the employee had, in fact, worked for Bemis in those weeks. At the hearing, the employee agreed with the employer's evidence regarding his work and wages in those weeks.(4)

The employee explained that he answered "No" to Question 4 because he did not "see" the "did you work" part of the question. He testified that he understood it to be asking solely about other forms of payment from his employer, namely sick, bonus or commission pay. He mistakenly believed that, since he had reported the Bemis employment at the initial claim level, a separate question about his hours with Bemis would "pop up" if he was required to report those hours. He added that since his work was part-time and he was unemployed from full-time employment, he thought he was eligible for benefits. He did not realize his misunderstanding and, thus, did not contact a claims specialist with questions about reporting his Bemis work.

Presumably, based upon the employee's answer to Question 4, he was paid his full weekly unemployment benefit rate each week for weeks 11 through 39 of 2013.(5) The employee would not have not received any benefits for week 9 because that was his "waiting week," the first week he filed for unemployment insurance benefits.(6)

When the employee was interviewed by an adjudicator regarding whether he had worked and earned wages, he agreed that he had been working and earning wages but he explained that he was no longer working due to a serious injury. It was then that another issue arose that resulted in a further denial of benefits. As of the time of the hearing, the employee had stopped filing for benefits because of his confusion with respect to his claim.

Exhibit 1 is the employee's request for hearing, dated November 18, 2013. In it, the employee claimed that he was either misinformed or misunderstood the information provided to him at the time he initiated his claim. He argued that he thought that, as a result of his approved training status, he was not required to look for work or report his work with his current employer because he was not a full-time employee. He indicated that he misread Question 7,(7) understanding it to only ask if he received other forms of pay, not the work he performed. He argued that if he was to report the work with Bemis, he expected that he would have been asked that earlier in the claim certification process.

Issues

The issues to be decided are whether the employee worked and earned wages in the applicable weeks, whether he concealed his work and wages for those weeks, whether he received benefits to which he was not entitled and which he must repay, and whether any concealment penalties must be assessed.

Standards and Burden of Proof of Concealment

Claimants who file for unemployment insurance benefits are responsible for correctly and completely reporting information for each week they claim benefits, because benefits are initially paid based on the information claimants provide. Claimants who conceal information from the department when filing for benefits may be subject to overpayments and penalties. For unemployment insurance purposes, conceal means "to intentionally mislead or defraud the department by withholding or hiding information or making a false statement or misrepresentation."(8)

A claimant who conceals work performed or wages earned when filing a weekly claim certification is ineligible to receive benefits for the week claimed.(9) In addition, a claimant who conceals work performed, wages earned, or another material fact concerning benefits eligibility when filing a weekly claim certification is ineligible for benefits in an amount equivalent to two, four, or eight times the claimant's weekly benefit rate for each act of concealment.(10) This ineligibility is applied against benefits and weeks of eligibility for which the claimant would otherwise be eligible after the week of concealment.(11) Furthermore, consistent with federal directives, the department assesses a penalty against the claimant in an amount equal to 15 percent of the benefits erroneously paid to the claimant as a result of one or more acts of concealment.(12)

A claimant is presumed eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, and the party resisting payment must prove disqualification.(13) The burden to establish that a claimant concealed information is on the department.(14) As a form of fraud, concealment must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.(15)

The unemployment insurance law must be "liberally construed to effect unemployment compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent upon others in respect to their wage-earning status."(16) Laws imposing forfeitures, by contrast, must be strictly construed to narrow the range of acts that will lead to the harsh result of a forfeiture.(17) As a result, concealment will not be found where a claimant makes an honest mistake or misinterprets information received from the department.(18) Concealment requires an intent or design to receive benefits to which the claimant knows he or she is not entitled.(19)

The existence of fraud in the form of concealment must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Because direct proof of a claimant's intent is rarely available, fraud may be proven by indirect (circumstantial) evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts. There is a rebuttable presumption that parties intend the natural consequences of their actions.(20)

Analysis

In any case where concealment is an issue, the commission first determines whether there is sufficient direct evidence of concealment, such as an admission by the claimant, to conclude that the claimant intended to mislead or defraud the department to receive benefits to which the claimant knew he or she was not entitled. If there is not sufficient direct evidence of concealment, the commission then looks to see whether there is sufficient indirect evidence from which the commission can infer an intent on behalf of the claimant to mislead or defraud the department in order to receive benefits to which the claimant knew he or she was not entitled. Few cases contain direct evidence of concealment; most cases must rely on indirect evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence to establish concealment.

Review of the indirect evidence generally involves the following inquiry:

1. Did the claimant file a claim for each week at issue?
2. Did the claimant provide incorrect information to the department in filing the claim?
3. Were benefits improperly paid to the claimant as a result of the incorrect information?
4. Do the circumstances create an inference that the claimant intentionally provided incorrect information in order to obtain benefits to which the claimant was not entitled?

Generally, in analyzing whether a claimant obtained benefits to which he or she was not entitled and should be required to repay, only questions (1), (2), and (3) are relevant. However, in analyzing whether a claimant engaged in concealment, which requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that a claimant intentionally misled or defrauded the department in order to obtain benefits to which the claimant knew he or she was not entitled, and which results in the imposition of a monetary penalty over and above the repayment of benefits, question (4) must be answered as well. An inference of concealment is not created by a mere showing that a claimant provided an incorrect answer when filing a claim.

If the evidence presented by the department does not suggest that the claimant intentionally provided an incorrect answer in order to obtain benefits to which the claimant knew he or she was not entitled, the inquiry ends. No concealment will be found.(21)

If the department presents sufficient evidence to create a reasonable inference that the claimant intended to mislead or defraud the department in order to receive benefits to which the claimant knew he or she was not entitled, the inquiry next turns to whether the explanation offered by the claimant for his or her actions successfully overcomes this inference.

This analysis is case specific, but the factors that may be considered are whether the claimant acted as a reasonable person filing for unemployment insurance benefits or whether the claimant acted in a wilful or reckless disregard of his or her responsibilities as a claimant when filing a claim. If the claimant establishes that it is more probable than not that he or she has made an honest mistake or good faith error in judgment, no concealment will be found. However, the claimant still will be required to repay the benefits which were overpaid. If the claimant fails to establish an honest mistake or good faith error in judgment, the inference of concealment drawn from the evidence remains and the commission will find concealment.

Application

In this case, Exhibit 3, together with the employee's testimony, establishes that the employee worked and earned wages. Exhibit 4 establishes that the employee answered "No" to Question 4, "During the week, did you work or did you receive or will you receive sick pay, bonus pay or commission?" The record thus supports a finding that the employee incorrectly answered the compound Question 4 for the applicable weekly claim certifications.

As outlined above, the employee's incorrect answer to Question 4 alone is insufficient evidence from which to infer intent to mislead or defraud the department to receive benefits to which the employee was not entitled. Although past commission decisions have referenced a presumption of intent based upon an incorrect answer and receipt of the handbook, the commission notes that those decisions involve a different question ("Did you work?") and the fact that hardcopy handbooks were sent with initial claims and often at other points during the claims process. Question 4 at issue in this matter was a compound question and, as such, is more susceptible to misinterpretation. An inference of intent cannot be made where the only evidence is that the employee answered a compound question incorrectly.

Besides the incorrect answer to the compound Question 4, there is very little additional evidence in the record to create a reasonable inference that the claimant intended to mislead or defraud the department in order to receive benefits to which he knew he was not entitled. There is no evidence that the employee previously claimed unemployment insurance benefits or that he filed for and received partial benefits. While the employee reported his work on his week 10 of 2013 certification, the certification was not marked as an exhibit and the employee was not questioned about his responses for that week. Given the fact that the employee worked 32 hours in week 10, the work was not part-time(22) and one cannot use his lone correct answer to Question 4 to create a reasonable inference of an intent to defraud in the remaining 30 weeks, all of which totaled less than 32 hours per week. Also, mere receipt of a handbook does not establish familiarity with the unemployment insurance program and the partial benefit process. Finally, there is no evidence that the employee had erred in the past and had been specifically warned that he was required to accurately report information on his weekly certifications, and that a failure to do so could result in penalties for concealment of information from the department.

Based upon the evidence, the commission is unable to infer that the employee's incorrect response to the compound Question 4, without prior filing experience, is sufficient to reasonably infer an intent to defraud. There are inherent dangers in inviting an answer to a compound question. It is often not possible to be certain to which part, or parts, a single response applies.(23) The department has not met its burden to present evidence sufficient to infer an intent to mislead or defraud the department in order to receive benefits to which the employee knew he was not entitled.

Based upon the finding that the employee did not intentionally conceal his work and wages, he is eligible for partial unemployment benefits in weeks 11 through 39 of 2013 pursuant to the partial benefit formula found at Wis. Stat. § 108.05(3)(a).(24) The commission is unable to compute the correct benefit payment and the overpayment because the record does not contain the employee's weekly benefit rate or the benefits paid for the weeks at issue. The commission will remand this overpayment calculation to the department, using the wage amounts as set forth in the following table.

 

Calendar Week Ending

UI Benefit Week

Gross Wages

Mar. 2, 2013

9

$56.99

Mar. 16, 2013

11

$399.89

Mar. 23, 2013

12

$401.28

Mar. 30, 2013

13

$133.41

Apr. 6, 2013

14

$401.28

Apr. 13, 2013

15

$400.53

Apr. 20, 2013

16

$401.28

Apr. 27, 2013

17

$401.03

May 4, 2013

18

$401.28

May 11, 2013

19

$401.28

May 18, 2013

20

$401.28

May 25, 2013

21

$267.27

June 1, 2013

22

$253.28

June 8, 2013

23

$401.28

June 15, 2013

24

$399.88

June 22, 2013

25

$394.16

June 29, 2013

26

$382.03

July 6, 2013

27

$267.02

July 13, 2013

28

$401.28

July 20, 2013

29

$400.45

July 27, 2013

30

$393.41

Aug. 3, 2013

31

$401.28

Aug. 10, 2013

32

$183.92

Aug. 17, 2013

33

$398.83

Aug. 24, 2013

34

$401.28

Aug. 31, 2013

35

$333.82

Sept. 7, 2013

36

$349.68

Sept. 14, 2013

37

$133.76

Sept. 21, 2013

38

$341.26

Sept. 28, 2013

39

$401.28

 

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 108.04(13)(c) and 108.22(8)(c), if the employer is not at fault in the erroneous payment of benefits, which the employer is not in this case, the employee must repay the overpayment unless the overpayment was due to department error and without fault on behalf of the employee. The overpayment was created when the department paid the employee based on the answers the employee provided on his weekly claim certifications. There was no department error and the employee was at fault. As such, the employee will have to repay the overpayment of UI benefits.

The commission therefore finds that, in weeks 9, and 11 through 39 of 2013, the employee worked and earned wages, but he did not conceal from the department the work performed and the wages earned in those weeks, within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11), and is thus entitled to partial benefits, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 108.05(3).

The commission remands the partial benefit and overpayment calculation to the department for determination, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 108.09(6)(d).

The commission further finds that the employee was overpaid UI benefits for weeks 11 through 39 of 2013, that he must repay pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 108.22(8)(c).(25)

DECISION

The appeal tribunal decisions are modified to conform to the above and, as modified, are reversed in part and affirmed in part. Accordingly, the employee is entitled to partial unemployment insurance benefits for weeks 11 through 39. The commission remands to the department for determination of the employee's partial benefit eligibility and the amount of his overpayment given the above findings. As a result of this decision, the employee will be required to repay the overpayment. However, his future unemployment insurance benefit amount shall not be reduced, and there is no concealment penalty.

Dated and mailed  May 30, 2014

vandeer2_urr . doc : 150 : BR 330 :  PC 749

BY THE COMMISSION:

/s/ Laurie R. McCallum, Chairperson

/s/ C. William Jordahl, Commissioner

/s/ David B. Falstad, Commissioner

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The department's Request for Reconsideration may be divided into three general assertions:

1) The commission was required to consult with the ALJ prior to reversing.
2) The commission improperly augmented the statutory definition of "conceal."
3) The department established concealment.

The department first asserted that the commission erred in failing to consult with the administrative law judge (ALJ) who held the hearing in these cases concerning the employee's demeanor and credibility. Although the commission does not agree that it is required to consult with an ALJ in every case in which it reverses an appeal tribunal decision, it did so in these cases at the request of the department.

The ALJ responded that the employee was sincere in his misunderstanding of Question 4, that the employee "was not trying to cheat the system," and that the employee must have misunderstood or he was misinformed by a claims specialist based upon a miscommunication. The ALJ added that, if he were to write the decisions again, he most likely would have come to a different result.

Next, with respect to the second assertion that the commission has unreasonably augmented the statutory definition of "conceal" by requiring that the claimant know he or she is not entitled to benefits, the department cites the case of Haise v. LIRC and Weavers, Inc., No. 95-CV-51 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Washington Cnty. June 16, 1995), in support of its argument. In Haise, the court stated that § 108.04(11) "does not require that concealment be with intent to defraud."

The department's reliance on Haise is misplaced. First, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11) does require that there be an intent to defraud.(26) This is unmistakably true after the effective date of 2007 Wisconsin Act 59. The law now unambiguously states that "conceal" means to intentionally mislead or defraud the department. The purpose of providing misleading or fraudulent information is to receive benefits to which the claimant would otherwise not be entitled.

Additionally, long before the legislature added the definition of "conceal" to Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11), the commission, dating back to at least 1959, has held that concealment involves an "intentional plan to withhold information for a fraudulent purpose." This fraudulent purpose is "to receive benefits to which the individual knows he or she is not entitled."(27) These commission decisions bind the appeal tribunals, as to achieve unemployment insurance legal conformity, decisions of higher unemployment insurance appeal tribunals and state courts "are considered binding upon lower tribunals" in deciding questions involving the interpretation of law.(28)

A statement of fact that is simply mistaken is not fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must be made with intent to deceive. A claimant who believes he or she has submitted a legitimate claim for unemployment benefits lacks the fraudulent intent essential to support a finding of concealment.

In this case, the employee received advice from the department which may or may not have been correct at the time it was given. The employee relied on that advice and filed his claims accordingly. As a result, he did not provide accurate information to the department on his weekly claim certifications, and he received benefits to which he was not entitled. However, the employee did not have the fraudulent intent essential to support a finding of concealment. Therefore, while the employee is required to repay the benefits he received in error, additional penalties will not be imposed.

As part of its argument regarding the ultimate concealment finding, the department attempted to supplement the record by attaching affidavits from various individuals who did not appear to testify at the hearing on the department's behalf. The commission finds that the department's attempt to supplement the record in this fashion is improper. The information presented in the affidavit was not new or recently developed. See, e.g., Walls v. Century Auto Sales LLC, UI Dec. Hearing No. 04402526AP (LIRC Dec. 22, 2004). The department could have had a department witness present at the hearing to provide the information contained in the affidavit. More importantly, an affidavit setting forth general practices will not overcome direct, firsthand testimony of what occurred.

Finally, the department argued that the commission improperly ignored what amounted to a prima facie case of concealment unrebutted by credible evidence. The commission disagrees. First, Wisconsin has not created any presumption of concealment by statute, and none has been created by case law. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the claimant intentionally concealed information from the department remains at all times with the department. The commission has explained in the decision why it found that the department's evidence was insufficient.

cc:
Janell Knutson, Director, Bureau of Legal Affairs
Robert Junceau, UI Attorney


Appealed to Circuit Court. Affirmed, May 22, 2015.  [Circuit Court decision summary].

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Footnotes:

(1)( Back ) Bemis Mfg. Co. was not a named party to this matter.

(2)( Back ) The employee was typically scheduled to work three eight-hour shifts each week at a rate of pay of $16.72 per hour.

(3)( Back ) The commission notes that the employee's weekly claim certification for week 10 of 2013 was not marked as an Exhibit. The department's records reflect that the employee reported working that week; in particular, he reported working 32 hours, which is defined as full-time by the department, and reported earnings over $500.00.

(4)( Back ) The gross wages are set forth in the Table.

(5)( Back ) The record does not contain information as to the actual amount of benefits paid in each week.

(6)( Back ) See Wis. Stat. §§ 108.02(26m) and 108.04(3).

(7)( Back ) The commission understands this to be a typographical or reading error as there is no Question 7 on the weekly claim certification and the employee's explanation of the question describes Question 4.

(8)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11)(g).

(9)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.05(3)(d).

(10)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11)(a), (b) and (be).

(11)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11)(bm).

(12)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11)(bh).

(13)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.02(11); Kansas City Star Co. v. DILHR, 60 Wis. 2d 591, 602, 211 N.W.2d 488 (1973).

(14)( Back ) In re Scott Lynch, UI Dec. Hearing No. 10404406AP (LIRC Mar. 11, 2011); Holloway v. Mahler Enter., Inc., UI Dec. Hearing No. 11606291MW (LIRC Nov. 4, 2011).

(15)( Back ) Kamuchey v. Trzesniewski, 8 Wis. 2d 94, 98, 98 N.W.2d 403 (1959); Schroeder v. Drees, 1 Wis. 2d 106, 112, 83 N.W.2d 707 (1957).

(16)( Back ) Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).

(17)( Back ) Liberty Loan Corp. & Affiliates v. Eis, 69 Wis. 2d 642, 649, 230 N.W.2d 617 (1975).

(18)( Back ) In re Joseph Hein, Jr., UI Dec. Hearing No. 00605374MW (LIRC Dec. 13, 2001); In re Scott Lynch, supra.

(19)( Back ) Karandjeff v. Cmty. Living Alliance Inc., UI Dec. Hearing No. 11611430MW (LIRC June 20, 2012); Holloway v. Mahler, supra, and the cases cited therein; In re Nestor Gutierrez, UI Dec. Hearing No. 00005766MD (LIRC July 19, 2002).

(20)( Back ) Krueger v. LIRC & Gen. Motors Assembly Div., No. 81-CV-559A (Wis. Cir. Ct. Rock Cnty. Dec. 3, 1982). See, also, Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 469, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980)(when there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his deliberate acts).

(21)( Back ) In re Leonard Miszewski, UI Dec. Hearing No. 12401605AP (LIRC Nov. 30, 2012).

(22)( Back ) For UI benefit purposes.

(23)( Back ) See, e.g., Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2008), citing 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 714 (2008)(the vice of the compound question is generally recognized; a question which embraces several questions is improper). In the UI context, UIPL No. 19-11, was issued by U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, on June 10, 2011. In the UIPL on pages 6-7, the U.S. Department of Labor strongly encouraged states to review the wording of their continued claims certification form and telephone script to assess whether any questions or language should be made clearer to ensure claimants understand what is being asked. The following example was given:

If the certification form or script contains a two-part question such as:

Did you work and earn wages during the week?

Two separate questions could be asked instead, such as:

Did you perform any work during the week?

If you worked, what was the amount of wages you earned during the week (report wages earned whether or not these wages have been paid)?

(24)( Back ) Wis. Stat. § 108.05(3)(a) provides, in material part, if an eligible employee earns wages in a given week, the first $30 of the wages shall be disregarded and the employee's applicable weekly benefit payment shall be reduced by 67% of the remaining amount, except that no such employee is eligible for benefits if the employee's benefit payment would be less than $5 for any week. . .

(25)( Back ) Since week 9 was the "waiting week," the employee was not paid and is not overpaid any benefits in that week.

(26)( Back ) See, e.g., Krueger v. LIRC, supra (for a forfeiture of future benefits to be imposed under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(11), there must be clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence in the record that the claimant intended to defraud, that is, to obtain benefits to which she knew she was not entitled).

(27)( Back ) See Holloway v. Mahler Enterprises, supra, and the cases cited therein.

(28)( Back ) Handbook for Measuring Unemployment Insurance Lower Authority Appeals Quality, Third Edition, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Unemployment Insurance, March 2011, Appendix B: A Guide to Unemployment Insurance Benefit Appeals Principles and Procedures, p. 8. See, also, Nethery v. LIRC, 2014 WI App 24 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014),  22 (unpublished decision) (LIRC's long-standing interpretation of § 108.04(11) provides uniformity in the application of the statute and is entitled to great weight deference).

 


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