State of Wisconsin
Labor and Industry
Review Commission
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Fair Employment Decision[1] |
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Complainant |
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Respondent |
Dated and Mailed: |
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ERD
Case No. CR201700277 EEOC
Case No. 26G201700492C ERD
Case No.CR201700278, |
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EEOC
Case No.26G201700494C |
June
13, 2018 |
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The ALJ's decisions in ERD
Case Nos. CR201700277 and 201700278 are affirmed. Accordingly, the complaints filed in ERD Case
Nos. CR201700277 and 201700278 are dismissed, with prejudice. The petition for
review in ERD Case No. CR201400225 is dismissed.
By the Commission: |
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/s/ |
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Georgia E. Maxwell, Chairperson |
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Laurie R. McCallum, Commissioner |
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David B. Falstad, Commissioner |
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Procedural History
ERD Case Nos. CR201700277
and CR201700278
On
January 27, 2017, complainant filed two separate complaints with the Equal
Rights Division of the Department of Workforce Development ("ERD") alleging
that respondent violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stat. §§
111.31-111.395 ("WFEA") by discriminating against him in hiring because of his
race, sex, and color, because he filed a previous discrimination complaint with
ERD, and because he opposed discrimination in the workplace. All of the alleged
discriminatory actions occurred in 2011 and 2014.
The
complaint in ERD Case No. CR201700278 is a photocopy of a complaint originally
submitted by complainant to ERD on November 8, 2011. The complaint alleged that he was
discriminated against between January and July, 2011,
due to respondent's rejection of complainant for three positions: Contract Specialist-Advanced; Purchasing
Agent Management Supervisor; and Correctional Services Treatment Director -
Office of Program Services. ERD declined
to accept the 2011 complaint and, on December 6, 2011, returned it to
complainant, explaining that he remained barred from filing certain WFEA claims
pursuant to a 2002 Wisconsin Personnel Commission ruling.
The
complaint in ERD Case No. CR201700277 is a photocopy of a complaint submitted
by complainant and received by ERD on May 12, 2014. That complaint alleged that respondent
discriminated against complainant between February and May,
2014, by rejecting another application he had submitted for the position of
Contract Specialist-Advanced. Like the
earlier 2011 complaint, the original 2014 complaint was never accepted by ERD. Rather, a notation was entered on the
complaint that it was "mailed back 6-9-14," and ERD returned the complaint to
complainant by letter on that date, again citing the 2002 Wisconsin Personnel
Commission decision.
The
ruling referenced in ERD's letters rejecting complainant's attempted 2011 and
2014 filings is a July 31, 2002, Wisconsin Personnel Commission decision in Balele v. DOA, et al., Case Nos. 01-0067-PC-ER,
01-0103-PC-ER, 01-0112-PC-ER, 01-0122-PC-ER, 02-0008-PC-ER, and 02-0034-PC-ER (the
"2002 WPC Ruling"). The 2002 WPC Ruling
bars complainant from filing any new complaints under the WFEA against certain state
agencies, including respondent Department of Corrections, until complainant
paid all monies due the State of Wisconsin arising from the following three
Dane County Circuit Court proceedings: Balele v. Wis. Pers.
Comm., et al., Case No. 00-CV-2876
($500 owed); State of Wisconsin v. Balele,
Case No. 00-CV-2776 ($1,114.91 owed); and Balele
v. Wis. Pers. Comm., et al., Case No. 01-CV-1182 ($500 owed). In each of its
two letters to complainant rejecting his attempt to file the 2011 and 2014 complaints
against respondent, ERD stated that it "will not accept any complaints from you
until you prove that you have satisfied the court judgments" and "[n]o further
action will be taken on the charges you recently sent us." Complainant never sought review of either the
2011 or 2014 decision letters.
Resubmitting
his 2011 and 2014 complaints on January 27, 2017, complainant acknowledged that
both of the earlier complaints had been previously submitted and rejected by
ERD, and that it was also related to "a similar case in the Federal district
court."[2]
With regard to the resubmitted
complaint in ERD Case No. CR201700278, complainant asserted that "[t]his is the
right time to re-litigate my case in ERD."
Unlike
the earlier complaints, ERD received each of the re-filed complaints in ERD
Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278, and commenced an
investigation. On April 18, 2017, an equal rights officer issued a Preliminary
Determination and Order ("PDO") in each case, finding that "[t]he Division has
since [the earlier rejection of his complaints by ERD] been made aware that
Complainant has satisfied his debt to the State of Wisconsin, and now finds
that he is no longer barred from filing complaints under the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act. The Division accepted
Complainant's complaint on February 9, 2017." PDOs ¶ IV.D. The evidence (and
source thereof) on which the equal rights officer relied in determining that
complainant had satisfied the debts referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling is
unclear. Nevertheless, the equal rights officer
found that ERD's earlier rejections of his complaints were proper since
"Complainant was provided an opportunity to submit proof that he had satisfied
all relevant debts and was no longer barred from submitting complaints. Had he done so, he could have resubmitted his
complaint in a timely manner and it would have been processed accordingly. Complainant failed to do this. As such, Complainant's initial date of
inquiry is officially January 27, 2017." PDOs ¶ V.A. Consequently, the equal
rights officer found that the allegations contained in the complaints - arising
in 2011 and 2014 - fell outside the 300-day limitations period preceding the
January 27, 2017, filing date, and dismissed the two complaints. PDOs ¶ V.C.
Complainant
filed timely appeals of the PDOs on April 24, 2017, and the cases were assigned
to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). On or about August 14, 2017, the ALJ sent a
letter to complainant in each case, providing him with an opportunity to
demonstrate that he had satisfied the debts referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling
when he originally attempted to file his complaints, or at any time thereafter.
Complainant responded with various
communications and documents that were considered by the ALJ.
On
October 6, 2017, the ALJ issued her Decision and Order on Appeal of Dismissal
in each of the cases ("Decision & Order") dismissing the complaints with
prejudice, finding that complainant had failed to (i) provide proof that he had
paid his debts to the State of Wisconsin as required by the 2002 WPC Ruling,
and (ii) present any such evidence to ERD at the time the original complaints
were rejected. Decision & Orders at
2-3, n.1-2. Absent satisfying both of these conditions, the ALJ found that ERD was
justified in rejecting the original complaints in 2011 and 2014, and there was consequently
no basis for tolling the statute of limitations. As a result, the ALJ affirmed the PDOs'
conclusions that the January 27, 2017, filings were time-barred under Wis.
Stat. § 111.39(1) for failing to be filed within 300 days of the alleged
discrimination. In doing so, the ALJ also deleted the PDOs' findings that "The
Division has since been made aware that Complainant has satisfied his debt to
the State of Wisconsin, and now finds that he is no longer barred from filing
complaints under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act" in light of complainant's
failure to provide any sufficient proof that he had in fact satisfied the debts
referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling, either at the time he attempted to file the
original complaints or at any time thereafter, and because the "Investigator
provided no reference to nor documentation of how or where he drew the
conclusion that [complainant's] complaints were no longer barred or that he had
paid his debt." Decision & Orders at
2-3.
On
October 19, 2017, complainant filed petitions for commission review of the
ALJ's Decision & Orders.
ERD Case No.
CR201400225
Complainant
filed Charge No. 443201301513 with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") on September 6, 2013, alleging discrimination by respondent
that occurred in 2011 and 2013. The
charge was cross-filed with ERD, which received a copy of the complaint on
September 24, 2013. Because the charge
was initially presented to EEOC and then filed with ERD, EEOC processed the
complaint first under the work sharing agreement between the two agencies. In
this complaint, complainant alleged that respondent discriminated against him by
refusing to hire him for five vacant positions in November 2011,[3]
and three additional positions in 2013, because of his race, color, and sex,
and in retaliation for having engaged in protected activities.
On
September 13, 2013, EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, notifying complainant
that EEOC was terminating its processing of his charge and that he had the
right to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
§§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). On October 8, 2013, complainant filed a discrimination
claim against respondent and certain other named defendants in Dane County
Circuit Court, attempting to allege various causes of action under both state
and federal
law,
including claims of unlawful discrimination under 29 USC § 1983 and
(apparently) Title VII.[4] Defendants removed the case to federal court.[5]
Much
like it had with the original complaints at issue in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277
and CR201700278, ERD sent complainant a letter on June 26, 2014, stating that ERD would not proceed with any
investigation of his complaint in ERD Case No. CR201400225 in light of the 2002
WPC Ruling barring complainant "from filing any new discrimination complaints
until [he] fully complied with several circuit court orders requiring [him] to
reimburse the State of Wisconsin for legal costs incurred in defending claims
the courts deemed frivolous." Complainant
never sought review of ERD's June 26, 2014, letter.
In
the meantime, complainant's discrimination claim proceeded in federal district
court. The particular discrimination claims alleged and reviewed by the federal
court in Olmanson were: (1) an
application and interview for a contracts
specialist-advanced in 2011; (2) three job applications and interviews for
correctional services management positions in 2013; and (3) an application and
interview as a contracts specialist-advanced in 2014.
The
Olmanson defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment and, on August 13, 2015, the federal district court ruled
that complainant failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding the alleged acts of discrimination. Specifically,
the court concluded that: (1) respondent rebutted complainant's prima facie
case of discrimination by showing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
not hiring complainant and that complainant did not show that these reasons
were pretextual; (2) complainant presented no direct or circumstantial evidence
that would give rise to an inference that respondent's decisions not to hire complainant
were motivated by discriminatory animus; and (3) complainant failed to establish
that the interview process had a disparate and adverse impact on African
American applicants. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. Balele v. Olmanson, et al., Case No. 13-CV-783, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106494, 2015 WL 4774107 (W.D. Wis. Aug 13, 2015).[6]
Although
ERD had not investigated or issued any decision in ERD Case No. CR201400225
since the issuance of the June 26, 2014, letter, complainant filed a petition
for commission review on October 19, 2017, in conjunction with his petitions
filed in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278.
Memorandum Opinion
Complainant's
petition for review asks the commission to remand these three cases back to ERD
so that he can continue to pursue his discrimination claims against respondent for
hiring decisions made in 2011, 2013 and 2014. In order to consider
this request, the commission must first assess whether it has jurisdiction to
consider complainant's appeal in ERD Case No. CR201400225. Then, the commission must determine whether any
of the complaints are: (1) barred pursuant to the 2002 WPC Ruling; (2) untimely
under Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1); and/or (3) barred under the doctrine of issue
preclusion.
Commission's
Jurisdiction to Review ERD Case No. CR201400225
As
described in the Procedural History, ERD's processing of the complaint in ERD
Case No. CR201400225 was confined to performing an intake review of the
complaint and determining that complainant was not entitled to file the
complaint pursuant to the 2002 WPC Ruling. ERD advised complainant of its determination in a June 26, 2014, letter. Complainant did nothing in response for more
than three years until he added a petition for review of ERD Case No.
CR201400225 to his petitions for review of the ALJ's Decision & Orders in
Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278.
Although
not denominated as such, ERD's June 26, 2014, letter decision is essentially a
preliminary determination dismissing the complaint as described in Wis. Admin.
Code § DWD 218.05(2). Wisconsin Admin.
Code § 218.05(3) provides that a "complainant may appeal from an order
dismissing a complaint under sub. (2) by filing a written appeal with the
department... within 20 days of the date of the order."
Complainant
is well aware that a petition for commission review is
not a substitute for departmental review of the decisions of ERD's
investigation bureau. In Balele v. PDQ Food
Stores Inc., ERD Case No. CR201203887 (LIRC July 3,
2014), complainant similarly attempted to petition the commission for review of
ERD's refusal to process his complaint since he had not yet complied with the
terms of the 2002 WPC Ruling. Citing Matthews v. Marc
Plaza Hotel, ERD Case No. 8005194 (LIRC March 31, 1983),
and Burton v. United Government Services
LLC, ERD Case No. CR200303077 (LIRC Nov. 11, 2011), the
commission concluded that its authority under the WFEA is limited, pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 111.39(5), to reviewing the findings and orders of ERD's
administrative law judges, and not the decision of ERD investigators or other employees. Consequently, the commission held that it was
without authority to entertain complainant's petition and dismissed it. This case is no different, and complainant's
petition for review in ERD Case No. CR201400225 is dismissed.
The
2002 WPC Ruling
In
each of the Decision & Orders in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278,
the ALJ found that the January 27, 2017, re-filings of complainant's 2011 and
2014 complaints were time-barred pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1). In particular, the
ALJ rejected complainant's argument that the original attempts at filing his
complaints were improperly denied by ERD and, therefore, should have tolled the
statute of limitations. Rather, the ALJ
found that the original complaints were properly rejected by the ERD as being
barred under the 2002 WPC Ruling.
While
the commission will review the ALJ's statute of limitations analysis below, we
find that this analysis leapfrogged a more fundamental infirmity applicable to all
of the complaints at issue in this matter - including the original complaints
from 2011 and 2014, as well the 2017 re-filing of those complaints in ERD Case
Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278 - namely, that complainant was and still is
subject to the filing ban imposed under the 2002 WPC Ruling.
As
an initial matter, the commission again notes that ERD's rejections of the
initial complaint filed in 2011 (subsequently refiled in 2017 in ERD Case No.
CR201700278), and the initial complaint submitted in 2014 (subsequently refiled
in 2017 in ERD Case No. CR201700277), as barred by the 2002 WPC Ruling were
never timely appealed after ERD notified complainant of those rejections and,
therefore, are not reviewable in this proceeding. As with the complaint filed in ERD Case No.
CR201400225, ERD notified complainant that it was rejecting his 2011 and 2014 filings
pursuant to the 2002 WPC Ruling and that it would not be further investigating
or otherwise processing his complaint, and yet complainant failed to timely
protest those decisions to the department. To allow complainant to challenge as part of these petitions those
decisions holding that the complaints were barred by the 2002 WPC Ruling would
amount to a collateral attack on the department's determinations of the type
that, as described in the previous section, is not allowed due to the limited
authority of the commission and/or complainant's failure to timely challenge
the decision with the department.
Consequently,
the commission declines to review ERD's refusal to permit the original filings
of the 2011 and 2014 complaints as precluded by the 2002 WPC ruling.
Alternatively, even if it were to review the merits of these decisions, the
commission would affirm them on the same basis relied on by the ALJ in her
Decision & Orders, and for the same reasons it finds the refiled complaints
barred by the 2002 WPC ruling.
As
the ALJ noted in the Decision & Orders in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and
CR201700278, ERD was warranted in rejecting complainant's 2011 and 2014 filings
since he had failed to provide ERD with timely proof that he had satisfied
those judgments required under the 2002 WPC ruling at the time of those filings
and when requested by ERD.[7] Whether he had paid those judgments or not,
it was incumbent upon complainant under the 2002 WPC Ruling to establish that
he had done so as a condition precedent to his filing any further WFEA claims
against those state agencies named in the 2002 WPC Ruling, including respondent
Department of Corrections. His failure
to timely offer any such proof means ERD's rejection of the 2011 and 2014
complaints must be sustained.
The
same can be said of the status of complainant's debt as of the time of the Decision
& Orders in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278. Prior to her ruling on complainant's appeal
of the PDOs dismissing his refiled complaints, the ALJ solicited from complainant
"any and all evidence that you have that, as of May 2014 (or any time
thereafter), you had fully complied with the [2002 WPC Ruling] to reimburse the
State of Wisconsin for legal costs incurred in defending claims the court
deemed frivolous." The only arguably relevant
evidence complainant offered in response was a letter that complainant received
in 2004 from one of the credit reporting agencies, noting that a private
employer had made an inquiry into complainant's credit history. Accompanying the letter was a listing of
"public record information contained on your credit file and provided to the
company listed above as a result of their
inquiry." Ignoring for a moment the
inherent unreliability of his proffered evidence,[8]
none of the information provided established that the three debts listed in the
2002 WPC Ruling had been paid.[9] In fact, one of the outstanding liabilities
listed by the credit reporting company was a debt to the State of Wisconsin, in
"Case No. CV2776," in the amount $1,114.00, strongly suggesting that, at a
minimum, the $1,114.91 owed in State of
Wisconsin v. Balele, Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2776 and ordered to
be repaid under the 2002 WPC Ruling, was still outstanding. Like the original attempts to file the
complaints in 2011 and 2014, the record fails to establish at the time of the
ALJ's Decision & Orders that complainant had complied with his obligations
to satisfy certain debts. Therefore his refiled complaints in ERD Case Nos.
CR201700277 and CR201700278 were barred by the 2002 WPC Ruling, and the
Decisions & Orders dismissing the complaints are affirmed on that basis.[10]
Stringing
together a concoction of legal theories such as issue preclusion and law of the
case, complainant's only real argument in his petition for review in support of
reversing the Decision & Orders is that ERD is forever bound to the
conclusion of the equal rights officer in his PDOs that ERD "has since been
made aware that Complainant has satisfied his debt to the State of Wisconsin,
and now finds that he is no longer barred from filing complaints under the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act," and that the ALJ acted outside the scope of her
authority in reversing that finding.[11] Complainant is wrong. First, the doctrines of issue preclusion and
law of the case have no application in the context of a direct appeal of a
lower authority's decision. It is
axiomatic that a higher authority can reverse the erroneous determinations of a
lower authority; that is exactly the purpose of an appeal. Second, the issue that complainant is arguing
- that he had indeed paid off the debts referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling - is
a question of fact that can only be sustained on appeal by either the ALJ or
the commission if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. As the ALJ noted in her Decision &
Orders, "The Investigator provided no reference to nor documentation of how or
where he drew the conclusion that [complainant's] complaints were no longer
barred or that he had paid his debt." It remains a mystery what evidence the
equal rights officer could have possibly relied on since a review of the record
as of the date of the PDOs discloses no evidence to suggest that
complainant had satisfied those debts referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling.[12] As described above, the additional documents
that complainant offered subsequent to the PDOs have similarly failed to present
substantial evidence that complainant had, in fact, paid off his debts, and the
commission affirms the ALJ's deletion/reversal of that finding from the PDOs.
Finally,
while the commission will not accept and review new evidence offered by the
parties after the ALJ closed the record,[13]
it will acknowledge those admissions that the parties make in their submissions
to the commission. In that regard, it is
worth noting that complainant submitted with his petition for review a
promissory note, "promis[ing] to pay $1,114 to the State of Wisconsin which
claims I should have paid toward the Personnel Commission's year 2002 judgments,"
and included a $100 check to the State as the first installment on that debt. Obviously, as a factual matter the promissory
note is immaterial - simply reaffirming the obligation to pay is not the
satisfaction of the debt as required by the 2002 WPC Ruling - but it is an
acknowledgement by complainant that at least the $1,114.91 debt arising out of
Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2776 remained unpaid as of the filing of the
petition on October 19, 2017.
For
all the foregoing reasons, the commission affirms the Decision & Orders' dismissal
of each and every one of the complaints referenced
above because he has failed to provide any substantial evidence to show that he
had paid off all his debts to the State arising from Balele v. Wis. Pers. Comm., et al., Dane Cty.
Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2876 ($500 owed); State
of Wisconsin v. Balele, Dane Cty.
Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2776 ($1,114.91 owed); and Balele v. Wis. Pers. Comm., et al., Dane Cty.
Cir. Ct. Case No. 01-CV-1182 ($500 owed), the satisfaction of which was a
condition precedent to him filing a WFEA claim against respondent pursuant to
the 2002 WPC Ruling.
Time
Limits Under Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1)
Even
if the refiled complaints in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278 were not
barred from being filed under the 2002 WPC ruling, they are time barred under
Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1). Pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 111.39(1), the department is authorized to receive and investigate
complaints charging discrimination "if the complaint is filed with the
department no more than 300 days after the alleged discrimination ... occurred."
Timeliness depends on whether the complaint is filed within 300 days of the
occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act. Through statutory construction,
that period of time has been interpreted to be a
statute of limitations. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC, 113 Wis.2d 199,
205, 335 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1983).
All of the discriminatory
conduct alleged in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278 occurred no later
than 2014. Therefore, on their face the
2017 filings fall well outside the 300-day statute of limitations under Wis.
Stat. § 111.39(1) and should be dismissed.
As
he did before the ALJ, complainant argues in his petition for review that the
complaints he refiled in ERD Case Nos. CR201700278 and CR201700277 were
improperly rejected by ERD in 2011 and 2014, respectively, and therefore the
300-day time limit for filing under Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1) should be tolled.
The commission rejects complainant's argument regarding the propriety of ERD's
rejection of the original complaints for the same reasons as set forth in the
preceding section. Complainant's
arguments amount to a collateral attack on ERD's rejections in 2011 and 2014 of
his original attempts to file the complaints and the commission will not revisit
those decisions given its limited authority and complainant's failure to timely
challenge the decision with the department. Alternatively, the ALJ was correct in concluding that complainant had failed
to present - even as of the date of the Decision & Orders - any substantial
evidence that he had paid the debts required under the 2002 WPC Ruling by the
time he originally attempted to file the complaints in 2011 and 2014, or that
he presented any such evidence to ERD at the time that he first attempted to
file the complaints and ERD rejected them pursuant to the 2002 WPC Ruling. Consequently, there is no basis for
concluding that ERD erred in rejecting the original complaints, and no basis
for tolling the statute of limitations. As a result, January 27, 2017, remains the operative filing date for
assessing the timeliness of the complaints in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and
CR201700278. Since those complaints were
not filed within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, the
complaints were appropriately dismissed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1).
Issue
Preclusion
Finally,
respondent asserts that even if complainant is successful in avoiding dismissal
of his several complaints under the various procedural issues addressed above, the
complaints should be barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion in light of the federal court decision in Olmanson. Issue preclusion applies to prevent a
complainant from relitigating before ERD a set of alleged discriminatory acts
after those allegations have already been rejected by a court, including a
federal court granting summary judgment to respondent. See, Aldrich v. LIRC, et al., 2012 WI 53, 341 Wis.2d 36, 814 N.W.2d
433; Williams v. Milwaukee Health Services, ERD
Case No. CR201203453 (LIRC Oct. 20, 2015); Balele v. PDQ Food Stores Inc., ERD Case
No. CR201203887 (LIRC June 18, 2015) and Banty v. Dings Co. Magnetic Group, ERD
Case Nos. CR200803382, CR200903205 (LIRC, July 31, 2012).
When
he submitted his complaints in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and CR201700278,
complainant noted that "[t]his is the right time to re-litigate my case in ERD." The relitigation of previously resolved
matters is exactly what issue preclusion prevents. Yet it should be noted that while issue
preclusion does apply, claims preclusion does not as a WFEA claim of any type
could not have been joined with the court action initiated by complainant and
removed to federal court. As a result,
respondent's argument that any "complaint" should be dismissed is too broad. Rather, issue preclusion would apply to bar
the relitigation of any of the individual allegations of discrimination that
were dismissed in Olmanson.
As
noted in the Procedural History above, Olmanson
arose out of the EEOC charge that was also cross-filed as ERD Case No. CR201400225,
so its most immediate impact would seem to be on the allegations contained in
that complaint. However, while each of
the complaints provide at best a rather vague and summary set of allegations, there
also appears to be a substantial amount of duplication in the allegations (to
the extent they can be discerned) among the various complaints that complainant
has filed. Complainant would be barred
from relitigating any and all of the specific acts of
discrimination that were disposed of in Olmanson,
regardless whether they are alleged in ERD Case No. CR201400225, or in the
complaints filed in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 or CR201700278. Thus, to the extent any of the complaints
assert claims of discrimination arising from:
1. The
application and denial of the contracts specialist-advanced position for which
complainant interviewed on or about January 18, 2011, and for which he was
scheduled to be re-interviewed on or about March 29, 2011;
2. The
application and denial of the correctional management services director position
for which complainant was interviewed on or about April 26, 2013;
3. The
application and denial of the correctional services manager position for which
complainant interviewed on or about June 4, 2013;
4. The
application and denial of the correctional services manager, director of
program services position for which complainant interviewed on or about June 6,
2013; and
5. The
application and denial of the contacts specialist-advanced position in 2014;
they
are hereby dismissed. These matters were
actually decided as part of the Olmanson decision, were essential to the judgment, and meet the
fundamental fairness requirements. See, Aldrich,
2012 WI 53, ¶¶ 97-100; Williams;
Balele v. PDQ Food Stores Inc., ERD Case No.
CR201203887 (LIRC June 18, 2015).
cc:
Respondent's Attorney Andrea Olmanson
[1]
Appeal
Rights: See the green
enclosure for the time limit and procedures for obtaining judicial review of
this decision. If you seek judicial review, you must name the Labor and Industry Review Commission as a respondent
in the petition for judicial review.
Appeal rights and answers to frequently asked questions about
appealing a fair employment decision to circuit court are also available on the
commission's website http://lirc.wisconsin.gov.
[2] This is an apparent reference to the
federal court litigation, Balele v. Olmanson, et al., Case No.13-CV-783 (W.D. Wis.), that
followed the filing of the third case at issue in this decision, ERD Case No.
CR201400225, EEOC Charge No. 44320130151, as described below.
[3] It appears that three of these referenced
positions may have been the rejected applications that were raised in the
original complaint that was refiled in ERD Case No. CR201700278.
[4]
Although the parties subsequently
debated whether Title VII claims were part of the action, the state court
complaint asserted that he had previously "filed his complaint with the EEOC
and has received a Letter of Right to Sue," and attached a copy of his Notice of
Right to Sue issued in EEOC Charge No. 443201301513. Balele
v. Olmanson, et al., Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 13CV3207, Complaint ¶ 41.
[5]
Complainant was up front as to his
motivation for filing in state court rather than federal court, noting that he was
also subject to an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Balele v. Barnett, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 41461 (7th Cir. Apr. 29, 1997), that all federal courts within
the circuit must reject any filing that complainant may attempt to make until
he has shown that he paid off certain substantial costs that were charged
against him in a number of previous cases he had frivolously pursued, and then
only after he submits an affidavit that the filing is not frivolous and has not
been raised in previous suits. As
complainant admitted, "this is the only court that can hear [complainant's]
case." Olmanson, Complaint ¶ 43. Notably, the 2002 WPC Ruling referenced the Barnett order when it fashioned the filing sanctions relied on by
ERD in the present cases.
[6] In addition to granting summary judgment, the court further augmented the Seventh Circuit's order in Barnett by requiring that any future cases brought by complainant that are removed from state court to federal court will require complainant to first file "proposed findings of fact in support of a motion for summary judgment" that will be reviewed by the court to determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude complainant's rights were violated. In the absence of proposed findings that sufficiently support a claim of discrimination, the court stated it would dismiss any new case at the outset without the need for defendants to file a summary judgment motion.
[7] Decision & Orders at 2, n.1.
[8] The "credit reports" and similar documents
complainant submitted to ERD, and subsequently to the commission (see, e.g., Appendix 3 to complainant's
November 20, 2017, Motion to Remand, which on first blush seems to belie complainant's
claim that he paid off all his debts as it continues to identify certain
unspecified debts to the Dane County Circuit Court), suffer from evident hearsay
and foundation issues that, without more, make them wholly unreliable in
proving the point he is attempting to make. Complainant's reliance on these documents is misplaced, and he will have
to do more in the future to overcome his burden of showing that he has complied
with the terms of the 2002 WPC Ruling.
[9] The Decision & Orders also note certain "Summit Credit Union records" that complainant submitted. Those documents appear to be a series of deposits into and withdrawals from complainant's account with the credit union, and have absolutely no relevance to this proceeding. See, also, the information discussed in note 11, below.
[10] After the issuance of the Decision &
Orders, complainant submitted a copy of an unsigned, carbon duplicate of a
check that he appears to assert was written to the State of Wisconsin on
October 10, 2002, in the amount of $1,114. This being offered after both the ALJ's deadline of August 28, 2017, for
providing proof that the relevant debts had been satisfied and the issuance of
her Decision & Orders, it is not part of the record and the commission will
not consider it. Wis. Admin. Code § LIRC
1.04. Even if it were considered, this
document does not provide sufficient proof that complainant had satisfied those
conditions under the 2002 WPC Ruling necessary to allow the filing of WFEA
complaints against respondent. There is no signature, and by its terms it is
"non-negotiable"; nor is there any indication that the check that is supposedly
represented by the copy was actually negotiated (i.e., delivered to and cashed by the
State), or what if any debts this was supposed to satisfy. No doubt, complainant would like the
commission to assume that this evidences a check
written to pay off the $1114.91 debt in Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2776,
but that would be contradicted by the credit report that complainant himself
submitted that appears to show that that debt was still outstanding as of 2004.
[11] To be certain, complainant has made myriad
assertions and arguments in his numerous filings, both with the ERD and the
commission, to support the continuation of his complaint. The commission has reviewed them all, and all
the others are meritless and do not even warrant discussion.
[12] In his March 17, 2017, response to
respondent's initial position statement in ERD Case Nos. CR201700277 and
CR201700278, in which respondent raised the issue of his need to comply with
the 2002 WPC Ruling, complainant claimed that "he had paid all his debts" and
that he "kept... records" (p. 16), citing an attached Ex. 8-C13. However, Ex. 8-C13 appears to be another copy
of the complaint and cover letter that he attempted to file in 2011, and says absolutely nothing on the issue of whether he
had paid the debts referenced in the 2002 WPC Ruling.
[13]
More recently, complainant produced a
copy of a satisfaction of judgment in State
of Wisconsin v. Balele, Dane Cty.
Cir. Ct. Case No. 00-CV-2776, entered on January 3, 2018. This is not part of the record before the
commission and, therefore, we reach no conclusion as to whether complainant has
in fact paid off this particular debt. Wis. Admin. Code § LIRC 1.04. The commission does note, however, that this
would be more the type of evidence that should be presented to ERD in any
future filing where compliance with the terms of the 2002 WPC Ruling is at
issue.