JESSE J HEPHNER, Complainant
ROHDE BROTHERS INC, Respondent
An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Equal Rights Division of the Department of Workforce Development issued a decision in this matter. A timely petition for review was filed.
The commission has considered the petition and the positions of the parties, and it has reviewed the evidence submitted to the ALJ. Based on its review, the commission agrees with the decision of the ALJ, and it adopts the findings and conclusions in that decision as its own, except that it makes the following modifications:
1. On line two of paragraph 3 of the FINIDINGS OF FACT, the name "Rohde" is deleted and the name "Hephner" is substituted therefor.
2. The first sentence of paragraph 10 of the FINDINGS OF FACT is deleted and the following sentence is substituted therefor:
"Rohde then told Hephner that he was being laid off because Rohde could not afford to pay him journeyman's wages for what he was doing."
The first sentence in paragraph 10 of the findings has been modified because, although there was not enough welding work left that Hephner was able to perform because his skill level was not at the journeyman level, the record does not show that Rohde specifically told Hephner this.
The decision of the administrative law judge (copy attached), as modified, is affirmed.
Dated and mailed June 30, 2004
hephnje . rmd : 125 : 9
/s/ James T. Flynn, Chairman
/s/ David B. Falstad, Commissioner
/s/ Robert Glaser, Commissioner
Under Wisconsin Statute Section 111.322(2m)(d), it is an act of employment discrimination to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because, among other things, the individual's employer believes that the individual filed a complaint or attempted to enforce a right under s. 66.0903 (Prevailing Wage Act) or 103.49 (Wage Rate on State Work Act), or may file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under said statutes.
The specific issue presented in this case is whether the respondent discharged Jesse Hephner because it believed that he might file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under Wis. Stat. § 66.0903 (1) or 103.49.
The respondent, a construction firm located in Plymouth, Wisconsin, installs and services commercial plumbing and heating systems. In August 2001, Ted Rohde, the company's vice-president, hired Hephner to work as a welder. While Hephner had welding experience, he was not a journeyman steamfitter and had never completed either classroom or on-the-job training to qualify as a journeyman steamfitter. He was also not qualified to become a steamfitter apprentice since he had not completed high school and had not obtained a GED. At his time of hire, Rohde asked Hephner if he was willing to get his GED so that he could get involved in the apprenticeship program, but Hephner stated that he was not willing to do so.
Rohde paid Hephner as a subjourneyman, also known as a preapprentice, a wage of $16 an hour, plus benefits, for a total compensation package of about $18 an hour. Rohde told Hephner at the time of hire that if his pay was lower than what was required by a prevailing wage job the difference would go into an account called a 401K white paper account in which he would be 100% vested immediately. This is something that the respondent has done with all employees. When Rohde had worked in the field in the trade, money was put into his 401K white paper account if the wages he was paid were lower than the prevailing wage.
After several days of employment, Hephner was assigned to work on the Resch Center project, an ice arena located in Green Bay, Wisconsin. The Resch Center project was a public works project and therefore required payment of the prevailing wage rates. The prevailing wage rate for a journeyman steamfitter was $31.17 an hour. On June 11, 2001, the DWD had sent the respondent a letter regarding the prevailing wage rates and qualifications for a number of occupations on the Resch Center project, including a subjourneyman steamfitter. This letter stated that "A subjourneyman steamfitter cannot weld and cannot join or weld pipe." Because Hephner was performing welding duties, the respondent should have been paying him $31.17 an hour.
On November 12, 2001, Hephner called Ted Rohde and asked why he was not getting journeyman steamfitter's pay for welding pipe on the Resch Center project. Rohde told Hephner that he would check into the matter. After this phone call, Rohde went and read the June 11, 2001 letter and found that Hephner was supposed to be paid the $31.17 per hour wage rate of a journeyman steamfitter because he was performing welding. That same day, Rohde faxed a copy of the DWD's June 11 letter to Hephner, on which he underlined the language that a subjourneyman steamfitter cannot weld and cannot join or weld pipe, along with another sheet with the calculation of $4,034.88 as the amount believed owed to Hephner. Hephner then called Rohde, as Rohde had requested in writing on the cover sheet of the fax. Rohde told Hephner that the company had made a mistake, that it owed him money and that the money was going to be deposited into a 401K white paper account. Hephner stated that he did not want the money deposited into a 401K white paper account and questioned whether Rohde could do that.
The next day, November 13, 2001, Rohde had David Schingick, a journeyman steamfitter foreman, get Hephner, and both report to the job site trailer at the Resch Center. Rohde, once again, explained the error that had been made, and told Hephner that the $4,034.88 amount would be deposited into a 401K white paper account. Rohde told Hephner that he was surprised to learn that a subjourneyman steamfitter could not weld on this job.
Rohde then told Hephner that he was being laid off because Rohde could not afford to pay him journeyman's wages for what he was doing. Rohde asked Hephner if he wanted to finish out the day, or if he wanted to leave right away. Hephner elected to finish out the day.
Rohde testified that he did not have any concerns about Hephner filing a wage claim because the respondent had made an error and had taken immediate action to correct the error.
Hephner alleges in his complaint that on November 12 when he asked Rohde why he wasn't getting the correct wage for welding pipe that Rohde stated he was making more than he had coming, and that he responded "it better be correct or I would go to the state for help." Hephner alleges that later on November 12 when Rohde told him a mistake had been made that the money owed him would be deposited into a 401K account, he told Rohde "this better be legal or I would go the state for help." Hephner alleges that he told Rohde this "many times."
At the hearing Hephner asserted that when hired it was his understanding that his regular hourly rate was $16, but that there would be a $15.17 hourly deposit to his 401K account. Hephner asserted that by October he had noticed that the 401K deposits were not reflected on his paycheck and that one day in October he asked Rohde about this. Hephner asserts Rohde said he would check "his stuff" out in the office and if an adjustment was needed it would be on the pay stub coming up. Hephner asserted that after his next paycheck failed to reflect a 401K account entry he called the office and talked to a secretary about it. Hephner asserted that following this, he spoke to Rohde on November 12 about the "missing 401K deposits" and that Rohde stated he was checking into it and was trying to get me put into another category. Hephner asserted that he responded saying he did not like that idea and that whatever he does should be right because I was going to go to the state otherwise.
Rohde asserted that Hephner never said anything about "This better be legal" on November 12 or November 13. Rohde asserted that Hephner had never threatened to go to the state for help or to file a complaint, or make any other similar statement, at any time in his employment. Rohde asserted that he did not tell Hephner, when first hired or ever, that the respondent would be putting $15 an hour into a 401K white paper account. Schingick asserted that he did not remember Hephner saying anything like "I'll go to the state if I don't get my money."
The ALJ concluded that Hephner was not credible in his assertions about having threatened to "go to the state" or to make or file any complaint or to take any formal action to enforce any right to back pay that he might have under s. 66.0903 or 103.49. In his memorandum opinion the ALJ stated why he did not find Hephner to be a credible witness:
In several parts of his testimony the Complainant exaggerated his testimony beyond credibility. His story was not consistent, as pointed out in the briefing of the case. The Administrative Law Judge found Rohde to be more credible than the Complainant. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge found Schingick to be a very credible witness. The vast majority of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Complainant did not make the threats that he alleges in this case. He had no reason to make such a threat. Rohde immediately responded to the question about wages, admitted the error without argument, and calculated the back pay within 24 hours of the first time the Complainant asked about the pay rate.
The ALJ's failure to find Hephner to be a credible witness is amply supported by the record. The following are but a few reasons why Hephner should not be believed: Hephner claimed at the hearing that he understood that from the time of his hire in August 2001 there would be from $14 to $15 per hour deposited into his 401K white paper account, as he knew the prevailing wage rate was around $30 per hour. However, when pressed on this Hephner admitted that when hired Rohde had never told him that there would be a deposit into his 401K account. Hephner claims that he confronted Rohde about the absence of deposits in his 401K account in October 2001. However, in correspondence to the Labor Standards Bureau dated January 9, 2002, relating to a wage claim against the respondent, when explaining the events that led to his November 13 layoff, Hephner does not say anything about having questioned Rohde about his wage rate in October, he only states that he questioned Rohde about not getting journeyman steamfitter's pay on or about November 12, 2001. Further, Hephner's January 9 correspondence does not say a word about him making any threat to Rohde about going to the state for help. Also, Steven Shew, employed by Wisconsin Pipe Trades, and who had assisted Hephner with his prevailing wage claim, testified that he could not recall Hephner telling him that Hephner had confronted Rohde before November 12 about his wages. Hephner claims to have spoken with the respondent's secretary about his wages, but he did not call her as a witness. Further, as noted by the respondent's counsel, if Hephner was expecting deposits to be made in his 401K account, then his complaint allegation that he had told Rohde many times that the 401K account deposit better be legal or he would go to the state makes absolutely no sense. Furthermore, in contrast to his hearing testimony about having expected the deposit of 401K money into his account from August, in correspondence to the Labor Standards Bureau dated January 14, 2002, Hephner asserted that he had never agreed to have money put into a 401K account and that he never would, claiming that "Because Rohde paid me only one-half of what I had coming he should not be allowed to place the rest in a tax saving plan for the company."
Although the ALJ did not find Hephner to be credible in his assertions about having told Rohde or Schingick that he would "go to the state" or "this better be legal," the ALJ does find that Hephner had "complained" to Schingick on November 12, 2001, about his rate of pay (Finding 7), and, apparently that he had "complained" to Rohde that he should be getting a higher rate of pay (Finding 15). In the Memorandum Decision the ALJ stated as follows:
The Labor and Industry Review Commission has held that, in order to state a claim of retaliation under this portion of the Act [s.111.322(2m)], the employer must know or believe that the employee intends to "enforce a right" by formal resort to the governmental agency charged with enforcement of that right. Pampuch v. Bally's Vic Tanny Health & Racquetball Club, (LIRC, 3-7-1994). The Commission has pointed out that there is no protection for oppositional activity under section 111.322(2m) of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Thus, the Complainant's oppositional activity of complaining about his rate of pay and asking for the prevailing wage rate is, in itself, not sufficient to state a claim under the Act.
Hephner argues on appeal that the record shows that the respondent terminated his employment out of a belief that he might attempt to enforce his right to be paid the prevailing wage rate. Hephner argues that he has established a prima facie case of retaliation and that the respondent's stated reasons for his termination are pretextual.
Hephner asserts that even if he did not threaten to "go to the state" as concluded by the ALJ, his "demand for wages owed under the prevailing wage law constitutes protected expression" under § 111.322(2m)(d). Evidently referencing the ALJ's Memorandum Decision statement, Hephner argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded that his wage demand did not constitute protected expression, and that the ALJ erroneously supported this conclusion by distinguishing this case from the commission's decision in Travis v. D.C. Nevels Trucking, Inc. (LIRC, 10/07/02). Hephner's arguments fail.
The protected expressions under § 111.322(2m)(d) entail those activities described in (2m)(a) to (c). Namely, the activities of "filing a complaint", "testifying or assisting in any action or proceeding" under the enumerated statutes, or "attempting to enforce any right" under those enumerated statutes. As indicated by the ALJ, the language "enforce any right" refers to formal attempts to enforce a right by resort to the governmental agency charged with enforcement of that right. See Pampuch. Hephner presented absolutely no evidence that he had engaged in any of these described activities.
However, because (2m)(d) also makes it an act of employment discrimination for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual because the individual's employer "believes that the individual engaged in or may engage in any activity described in pars. (a) to (c)", the question presented here is whether Hephner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent believed that he might file a complaint or attempt to enforce any right under § 66.0903 or 103.49.
Hephner argues that the record shows that his termination was retaliatory and in violation of § 111.322(2m)(d). Hephner argues that from August 2001 until November 12, 2001, the respondent violated the prevailing wage laws by failing to pay him journeyman-level wages for his welding work, that he "demanded payment of lawful wages", and that on the following day Ted Rohde terminated his employment, stating that "the company could not afford to pay [him] lawful wages." Hephner argues that Rohde's statement regarding what the company could afford clearly shows that Rohde terminated him under the assumption that he, by recourse to the department, could and would compel the respondent to pay him lawful wages from that day forward. Hephner argues that if this were not the case, Rohde simply could have offered to retain him on the condition that he continue working at the lower wage rate.
The commission concludes that the record in this case fails to show that the respondent had reason to believe that Hephner would file a wage complaint.
First of all, while Hephner argues that on November 12 he "demanded payment of lawful wages" from Rohde (and the ALJ also indicates in Finding no. 15 that Hephner had "complained" to Rohde about his wages), neither Hephner's February 4, 2002 complaint of retaliation, his earlier January 9, 2002 correspondence to DWD regarding his wage complaint or the credible hearing testimony suggests that this was the tenor of his conversation with Rohde. Indeed, in his retaliation complaint Hephner alleges that "I ask[ed] Ted Rohde why I was not receiving the correct wage for welding pipe." In his January 9 correspondence, Hephner states "I questioned Ted Rohde why I was not getting journeymen (sic) steamfitter's pay for welding pipe on that job." (Emphasis added.)
What the record does indicate in this case is that the respondent made an honest mistake in the payment of Hephner's wages. Ted Rohde, who had requested numerous determinations for prevailing wage projects, testified that the respondent was not aware of any restriction that prohibited a subjourneyman from welding. Hephner, however, contests Ted Rohde's assertion that he had been unaware of the department's June 11, 2001 restriction that subjourneymen could not weld because the company had received an identical notice from the department on December 19, 2000, regarding the Outagamie County Health Center project. Hephner argues that neither the respondent nor the ALJ explained how Rohde could have been unaware that the department does impose this type of restriction such a short time after the respondent had received a similar restriction from the department. Hephner argues that the respondent deliberately misclassified him in an unlawful attempt to circumvent the prevailing wage laws. The record does not support Hephner's assertions. Rohde testified that he did not become aware of the December 19, 2000 wage determination until November 2001, when they were looking into Hephner's question about his wages. Rohde explained that the respondent had requested many subjourneyman determinations from the department in the past and that those determinations had not restricted subjourneymen from welding. Rohde explained that because these determinations had all been exactly the same, they had simply not reviewed each one carefully. Rohde explained that it was not until November 2001 when the respondent first discovered that the Outagamie County Health Center project determination had the restriction about subjourneymen welding. Rohde credibly explained why the respondent first became aware on November 12, 2001, that the respondent could not assign Hephner to welding duties as a subjourneyman. Indeed, Hephner himself admits that in his second conversation with Rohde on November 12 Rohde stated that he was surprised to learn that a subjourneyman could not weld.
Furthermore, when the respondent did learn on November 12 that Hephner would have to be paid at the journeyman steamfitter rate, it immediately admitted the error to Hephner, and on the same day had the amount owed calculated and faxed the calculations to Hephner along with the June 11 DWD prevailing determination that stated subjourneyman steamfitters could not weld.
Hephner never disputed the calculation.
In addition, Rohde testified that on November 13 when he told Hephner that he had corrected the wage disparity problem and that Hephner was being laid off, that Hephner was "somewhat indifferent of it. He wasn't upset nor was he joyous." Similarly, Schingick testified that the atmosphere during the November 13 meeting was businesslike, there was no shouting and that neither Rohde nor Hephner were angry.
Furthermore, after Rohde informed Hephner he was being laid off, Rohde offered Hephner the choice of finishing out the day and Hephner chose to work the rest of the day. It seems unlikely that Rohde would have offered to allow Hephner to work the rest of the day if Rohde believed that Hephner might attempt to enforce a right under the wage laws.
Hephner argues that Rohde terminated him stating the "Company could not afford to pay [him] lawful wages." Hephner argues that this statement clearly shows that Rohde terminated him under the assumption that he, by recourse to the department, could and would compel the respondent to pay him lawful wages because otherwise Rohde could simply have offered to retain him on the condition that he continue working at the lower wage. The commission disagrees. First of all, as reflected in Hephner's own January 2002 correspondence to the department, what Rohde actually told Hephner when he laid him off, was that the respondent "could not afforded (sic) to pay me journeyman's wage for what I was doing." (Emphasis added.) This statement conveys nothing about an assumption by Rohde that Hephner could and would compel the respondent to pay him the prevailing wage rate. Furthermore, the respondent could not have legally retained Hephner on the condition that he continue working at the lower wage rate. The respondent had employed Hephner to perform welding. Hephner was not a journeyman steamfitter, he did not qualify to become a steamfitter apprentice because he had not completed high school or obtained a GED, and when hired he had told Rohde that he was not interested in going back to school to get his GED so he could become an apprentice. Apparently, Hephner is suggesting that the respondent, after discovering that it was not paying the proper wage, should have violated the prevailing wage law in order to continue his employment. This makes no sense. The respondent clearly would have been setting itself up for a complaint had it attempted to do this. Offering to continue Hephner's employment as a welder at a lower rate of pay than required, when Hephner knew he was entitled to a higher rate of pay for welding, would not have provided any satisfaction to Hephner.
Hephner argues that where such fundamental interests as insuring that persons subjected to unlawful treatment are not deterred from seeking justice, enforcement of § 111.322(2m)(d) should not be reduced to asking whether an employee has uttered the right "magic words." Further, he argues that the ALJ's decision requires that an employee make an explicit threat to file a complaint before coming under the protection of the statute.
Hephner's arguments fail. Section 111.322(2m)(d) makes it an act of employment discrimination for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual because the employer believes the individual may file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under various referenced statutes. This statute is concerned with the motives of the employer. It does not require any "magic words" by the employee. The employee is simply required to present sufficient facts and circumstances that establish that an employer has taken unlawful action because it believes he or she might file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under the referenced statutes. Furthermore, an employee need not make an explicit threat to file a complaint before coming under the protection of the statute, as the commission's decision in Travis v. D.C. Nevels Trucking, Inc. (LIRC, 10/07/02), demonstrates. In Travis, the commission held that Nevels Trucking had violated § 111.322(2m)(d) by terminating Brian Travis' employment because it believed he might attempt to enforce a right under the prevailing wage laws. The commission came to this conclusion based on the following evidence: Travis had informed the employer that a representative of the Department of Transportation instructed him to ask why he was not being paid prevailing wages; the employer responded by stating that he was "raising her blood pressure, that she never had any problems like this until he came to work for her company, and that she didn't need him to come to work anymore"; when Travis asked if he was being fired the employer responded "Yes," that she didn't need "these problems"; when the employer was discussing "these problems" she told Travis that he "was trying to get the company in trouble with the Department of Transportation"; the employer was aware that the work being performed by Travis was a prevailing wage job; and the employer was familiar with the Department of Transportation's role in the enforcement of the prevailing wage law.
The commission found a violation of § 111.322(2m)(d) in Travis despite the absence of an explicit threat to file a complaint by the employee. The facts and circumstances presented in Travis convincingly showed that the employer discharged the employee because it believed the employee might attempt to file a complaint or enforce his right to be paid the prevailing wage.
Unlike the Travis case, however, the evidence in this case fails to show that Rohde had any reason to be concerned about Hephner filing a complaint or attempting to enforce a right with respect to payment of the prevailing wage. As the ALJ noted about the employer in this case: "This employer obtained prevailing wage rate information, had paid prevailing wage rates on many jobs, and paid them on this job. The employer made a mistake regarding the classification of subjourneyman pipefitter, and immediately admitted the mistake and paid the wages due without question, argument, or hostile expression when the employee asked about the wage rate."
Hephner argues that a causal link exists between his "demand" for wages and his termination of employment because his termination occurred on the day following his "demand" of payment. It is true that timing can give rise to an inference of a retaliatory motive. However, "timing . . . does not in itself establish retaliation." Kannenberg v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 373, 396, 571 N.W.2d 165 (1997).
Rohde told Hephner that he was laid off because the respondent could not afford to pay him journeyman's wages for what he was doing. The credible evidence indicates that the timing of Hephner's layoff was due to a combination of his limited skills and the respondent's decreasing need for a welder.
Welding work on the Resch Project was slowing down. About 90% of the welding on this project had been completed. Prior to laying Hephner off, at the end of October 2001 the respondent had discontinued the services of an outside contractor who was performing welding work on the Resch Project. After Hephner's layoff, Schingick and an apprentice continued to perform the welding work until about March 2002. It was more advantageous for the respondent to have the apprentice stay on the project than Hephner. The apprentice, a certified welder, attended school to learn how steamfitting systems worked and therefore had a better working knowledge of steamfitting systems than Hephner, and, in addition, had also been with the company longer than Hephner. Also, financially, it was more economical to continue the employ of the apprentice since apprentices were compensated at between 45 and 75% of the journeyman's pay. Given Hephner's limited skills and the decreasing need for a welder, the respondent found it more economical and efficient if it chose to lay off Hephner. Also, in addition to the work slowing down on the Resch Project, as a result of the events of 9-11-01, the respondent had also lost two private contract projects and as a result laid off five other journeyman level employees in various trades at about the same time Hephner was laid off.
The respondent's reasons for laying off Hephner were valid and lawful business reasons. Hephner was a short term employee with one primary skill, welding. He had been with the company less than four months. Welding work at the Resch Center project was largely completed and could easily be completed by Schingick and an apprentice more efficiently and economically than by Hephner.
Hephner, however, citing Rohde's testimony at pages 277-278 of the transcript, argues that Rohde admitted that the "Department's requirement that Rohde Brothers pay Hephner the journeyman's rate for his welding work was a primary reason for the termination decision", that Rohde "went so far as to say that Hephner's employment would have continued but for the prevailing wage laws" and that this "amounts to an admission that Rohde Brothers terminated Hephner because of Hephner's assertion of his right to be paid the prevailing wage." The commission is not persuaded by these arguments. First of all, what Rohde actually states is that the prevailing wage rate requirement had "something to do" with Hephner's layoff and that if it were not for the prevailing wage requirement as to Hephner's employment he would have been laid off within a week or so anyway due to the work slow down. Second, of course the prevailing wage rate requirement had something to do with Hephner's layoff. It would have cost the respondent significantly more to continue to employ Hephner. The welding work on the public project was winding down and could be performed more economically by an apprentice rather than keeping Hephner on and paying him the same rate as it paid Hephner's foreman, Schingick, an experienced journeyman steamfitter and long term employee. Section 111.322(2m)(d) prohibits discrimination against an employee because the employer believes that the employee might file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under the prevailing wage laws. It does not require an employer to retain an employee when other more qualified employees can lawfully perform the work at a significantly lower cost. Hephner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent terminated his employment because it believed that he might file a complaint or attempt to enforce a right under the prevailing wage laws.
Hephner argues that the respondent, like the employer in Travis, asserted that it could not afford to pay the prevailing wage but this pleading was of no avail to the employer in Travis. However, there was considerably more than this that was involved in the Travis case, as discussed above.
Hephner also argues that the respondent's assertion for terminating his employment included his lack of journeyman-level skills and that this constitutes an after-the-fact attempt to justify its unlawful retaliation because the respondent had not raised any concerns regarding his lack of journeyman-level skills prior to his "demand for a lawful wage." The commission disagrees. The respondent knew that Hephner did not have journeyman-level skills when it hired him. The respondent did not expect him to have journeyman-level skills, it just hired him to perform welding. Welding is only one duty that journeymen perform. However, when the respondent learned that it should be paying Hephner the same wage rate that it paid Hephner's foreman, Schingick, an experienced journeyman steamfitter and long term employee, it was only at that point that his skill level became an issue.
Next, Hephner apparently argues that the respondent did not prove that it had a work slowdown. However, the respondent's burden was only to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the Hephner's layoff. It is Hephner's burden to prove that the respondent's stated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Rohde and Schingick both testified about the work slowdown that had occurred at the respondent and the resulting layoff of employees. Hephner presented no evidence for reason to believe that their testimony was not credible or otherwise unworthy of belief. Indeed, Hephner himself admits that he knew that the outside contractor was no longer working on the Resch Center project.
Finally, Hephner argues that because Rohde had expressed uncertainty about whether he could have found work for him on private sector projects, this uncertainty "obviously stemmed from the respondent's retaliatory reasons for terminating Hephner." This argument is without merit. The question that had been posed to Rohde was whether there would have been private project work for Hephner had the respondent not lost the two private projects due to the events of September 11, 2001. Rohde expressed uncertainty because at about the same time Hephner was laid off, the respondent had also laid off five other journeymen working in various trades. T. 246. This had included the steamfitting instructor for the apprenticeship program, and two journeyman plumbers who were qualified to perform welding duties. T. 247.
Based upon all of the above-stated reasons, the commission has affirmed the administrative law judge's dismissal of Jesse Hephner's complaint in this matter.
cc:
Attorney Timothy C. Hall
Attorney Susan C. Sheeran
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